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Ontological conditions for non-evil 
In this article three interlocking ontological prerequisites for a condition of 
non-evil are identified. The first is the idea of a plurality of human aspects 
and dimensions that give one another room to exist, instead of an 
oppressing reduction to one aspect only. Secondly, these aspects need to 
exist next to one another as equally valued. This condition implies that 
even if a person lacks some aspect, she can still be affirmed as a human 
being because her humanity does not depend entirely or even mainly on 
the superiority of the missing aspect. Equality is, however, often interpreted 
as a homogenisation of all dimensions of life to one aspect only. This 
monism is a denial of variety and will only evoke its anti-pole in the form of 
a disengaged dualism or pluralism. I therefore argue that a third condition 
for the manifestation of a condition of non-evil is engagement between the 
aspects and dimensions of human life. 
Opsomming  
Ontologiese voorwaardes vir nie-boosheid 
In hierdie artikel word drie aaneensluitende ontologiese voorwaardes vir ’n 
toestand van nie-kwaad geïdentifiseer. Die eerste is die idee van ’n 
pluraliteit van menslike aspekte en dimensies wat aan mekaar ruimte gun 
om te bestaan in plaas van ’n verdrukkende reduksie van lewe tot net een 
aspek. Tweedens, hierdie aspekte behoort gelykwaardig te bestaan. Dit 
beteken dat selfs as ’n persoon een van hierdie aspekte kortkom, sy steeds 
as mens beskou kan word, want haar menslikheid is nie totaal of selfs 
hoofsaaklik afhanklik van die superioriteit van hierdie een aspek nie. Maar 
gelykheid word baie keer geïnterpreteer asof dit ’n homogenisering van alle 
lewensdimensies tot slegs een aspek beteken. So ’n monisme is ’n ont-
kenning van die verskeidenheid en sal slegs die teenoorgestelde in die 
vorm van ’n gefragmenteede dualisme of pluralisme ontlok. Die artikel sluit 
daarom af met die gedagte dat ’n derde voorwaarde vir die manifestering 
van ’n toestand van nie-kwaad ’n verbinding of samehang is tussen die 
verskillende aspekte en dimensies van menslike lewe. 
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1. Introduction 
The manifestation of evil in the twentieth century is a legacy without a 
testament, Buijs and Woldring state (2001:7-8)1. The absence of a 
testament refers to the astonishment when the nineteenth-century and 
early twentieth-century hope for a moral perfection of humanity did not 
materialise. In fact, the moral history of the twentieth century became the 
scene of the revival of evil in extreme forms; it is a legacy that was not 
expected. The early twenty first century repeated this experience when, 
after the end of the Cold War, the events of 11 September 2001 in New 
York and Washington (when fanatic Muslims hijacked three passenger 
planes and crashed them into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon) 
caused a chilling reminder of the atmosphere of evil during the days of 
the Second World War and the Cold War. 
The events of 9/11 especially reminded us that religious fanaticism can 
be a source of evil. The fanaticist undertones in the so-called war against 
terrorism that followed did not do much to exonerate Anglo-American 
Christianity and Judaism from the burden of being sources of evil either. 
We also remember the bloody histories – in the name of Christianity – of 
the Crusades, Inquisition, religious wars, and colonialism. It is therefore 
not strange that the naturalist traditions of modernism and post-
modernism accuse ontologies with metaphysical and religious roots of 
being sources for wickedness. But this is only part of the story because 
the flaw that leads to fanaticism is by far not restricted to religious and 
metaphysical traditions only, as the evil of secular exponents like 
Nazism, Stalinism, Pol Pot and others so vividly remind us. In fact, Buijs 
and Woldring (2001:10-12) point out that for the majority of continental 
political philosophers the focus of thinking is still the experience of these 
totalitarian regimes with their unprecedented oppression and mass-
cruelty. 
Of course, all these examples stand in stark contrast to the claims of 
religious and naturalist traditions about the importance of respecting and 
enhancing the life of fellow human beings. Contemporary life is thorough-
ly imbued by these traditions with their opposition to all kinds of 
wickedness (i.e. the evil that humans do2). In fact, we can even speak of 
a contemporary ethos of anti-wickedness, which is the direct opposite 
                                           
1 They repeat a seminal idea of Hannah Arendt. 
2 In this respect I rely on the traditional division between moral evil or wickedness that 
arises “from the inhumanity or the culpable incompetence of mankind”, and the 
nonmoral evil of suffering or pain “that are entirely independent of the human will” 
(Hick, 1973:38-40). 
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reaction to the oppressing and terrorising violence and counter-violence 
associated with the fanatic developments of the twentieth century. 
What then is the nature of the lapses of religious as well as secular 
traditions into episodes of evil? (This ontological way of formulating the 
question is not precisely the same as the more psychological and 
theological question about the causes of these lapses.) The question 
about the nature of evil can also be put from another more general and 
positive angle: What are the ontological conditions that will limit the 
influence of wickedness on our world? 
In my attempt to answer this question, I will depart from the old Christian 
dictum that evil is the perversion or deformation of an original good 
creation.3 To be more specific: In opposition to the totalitarianism that 
spells the core of the twentieth-century experience of evil,4 I will argue5 
that human wickedness ensues from those human actions and directions 
that oppose, suppress, and attempt to kill life as a rich diversity. In this 
attempt I will argue that specifically the non-recognition of the plurality of 
creation, the non-recognition of the equality of this plurality, as well as 
the non-recognition of the need for this plurality to be inter-connected, 
will prepare the way for evil actions to arise. 
2. Plurality 
2.1 Modern naturalism 
In a well-known part of his Dialogues concerning natural religion, David 
Hume (1947:205-210) gives an explanation of four interlocking “circum-
stances” on which all ills of the world and our life in it depend. It is 
particularly the third and the fourth “circumstance” that interest me. The 
Christian assumption about evil as the deformation/perversion of the 
good creation, is related to his fourth circumstance for non-evil, that is 
that the “parts of the universe” should “hang all together”. Evil arises, he 
says, when some parts of the universe do not “keep precisely within 
those bounds in which their utility consists”; that is when they “run into 
                                           
3 This view is rooted in the “classic Christian teaching, first developed by Augustine, 
that evil represents the going wrong of something that in itself is good” (Hick, 
1973:37). From particularly a Christian-Reformational perspective Marshall (1998:32) 
describes the deformation of creation as follows: “Sin distorts everything, perverts 
everything, corrupts everything. Sin lives off that which is good. It is a parasite, 
feeding greedily on the goodness of what God has made.” 
4 As Buijs and Woldring (2001:10-12) argues. 
5 As Peck (1990:46-47) also suggests. 
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the one extreme or the other”. For instance, the “greatest convulsions in 
society” occur when the “passions of the mind, ambition, vanity, love, 
anger”, which in themselves are useful, break their limits. With this view 
Hume is in the vicinity of one of the most important conditions for evil to 
arise, namely the obsession with some part of creation and the 
consequential suppression or even death of the non-obsessed parts. 
Paradoxically he does not try to evade this condition for evil when he 
appoints the mind and related faculties as the ultimate source for human 
life. The third condition for non-evil is his observation that “reason and 
sagacity” is our “chief excellency” because we lack the bodily advantages 
that animals have for survival. But then it happens that people fall short 
of the rational capacity; that they do not excel in a “vigorous spring and 
activity of mind” and with it a “propensity to industry and labour” and that 
therefore only “the most violent necessity can oblige … [them] … to 
labour”. Hume, of course, saw no contradiction between his fourth and 
third conditions for evil because the structure of reality is probably for him 
a rational structure which means that faculties other than the rational 
should take a lesser or subordinate position, which consequently then 
constitutes their proper position. 
It is under the third condition for evil that Hume (1947:219-226) also 
categorises what he calls superstitious and enthusiastic religion. 
Fanaticism abounds with “pernicious consequences on public affairs” like 
factions, war, persecutions, oppression and so on. He therefore thinks 
that true religion should distinguish itself in three ways: It should first and 
foremost be rational, secondly, promote a temperate style and, thirdly, be 
a humane morality. 
But can we, who live after the twentieth century with its scientific, 
technological, economic and administrative enhancement of cruelty, still 
maintain that emotion is mainly a menace, and that rationality will 
necessarily lead to non-cruel conduct? We live in (another) post-
rationalistic era and profess to have learned the evils of the obsession 
with (the various forms of) rationality. Should we not also acknowledge 
that we need other human faculties and values, like emotion and 
compassion, to inculcate non-cruelty? Hume’s fourth circumstance for 
the development of evil indicates that emotions which overstep their 
boundaries seriously hamper the functioning of reason and thus lead to 
evil. It should, however, be added that a rationality which expands 
beyond its borders will produce the same result. 
A recent theory about evil that shows some similarities with that of Hume 
is Garrard’s (2002:321) attempt to define evil. For her, such a theory 
should give “some distinctive feature” for an act to be evil. More 
important, this theory should also include the state of mind of the evildoer 
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because we “understand human action in terms of the reasons which the 
agents take there to be for acting”. For it to be secular this theory should 
exclude any reference to something “trans-human” or something “meta-
physical”. Of course, a thoroughly naturalistic theory devoid of anything 
metaphysical will even resist any reference to the idea of an agent or his 
reasons and opt for a behaviouristic-like explanation of human acts. In 
the next section I will deal with Foucault who attempts just that. But this 
radical secularisation is not yet an option for Garrard. In fact, she expects 
the human ability to interpret situations to be the only guard against a 
world that recedes totally into evil. There is nothing “trans-human” to help 
us deal with evil in the same way as there is nothing “trans-human” that 
causes evil. This, of course, reminds of Hume’s paradoxical reliance on 
an absolutised human reason to be the only shield against fanaticism. 
Garrard’s (2002:329-331) theory argues “that the evil act can be 
identified by reference to the reasons which the agent sees and fails to 
see, for acting”. According to this, “the evil action is one in which the 
agent is entirely impervious – blind and deaf – to the presence of 
significant reasons ... for acting or refraining from action”. For instance, to 
protect his child from dying from a disease, a person should spend 
money to heal the sick child. He can argue he wants to save money and 
not spend it on his sick child. This act will be evil because this reason for 
action (saving some money) means the person is blind for a significant 
reason (saving his child’s life) for the appropriate action. Another 
example is that of the torturer who knows that he is causing appalling 
pain to his victim. He nevertheless proceeds with his torturing which 
means that he is in some way blind to the fact that “the pain which the 
victim is suffering is an overwhelmingly strong reason for him to desist”. 
The evil person then suffers “from a profound cognitive defect – an 
inability to grasp the presence of reasons of the first importance”. 
Despite her secular obsession with the human ability of interpretation to 
resist evil, Garrard has the paradoxical intuition (very similar to Hume) 
that some deification of some part of reality prepares the way for evil to 
appear. If an obsession makes one blind to other reasons or aspects of 
reality for acting, it means that this obsession makes you blind to the 
variety in life and reasons this variety gives for other actions. In other 
words, the deformation of reality because of an absolutisation of some 
part of it and the suppression or elimination of other parts/reasons, is an 
important condition for evil to arise. This “anti-ism” suggests that, 
ontologically speaking, we need to start with the recognition of a plurality 
of human functions and dimensions of, and reasons for life to evade the 
evil of distorted actions. 
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2.2. Postmodern naturalism 
The suppression of the plurality in human life is not restricted to fanaticist 
religion and modern rationalism. In important respects, recent irrationalist 
naturalism (postmodernism) falls in the same category despite its much-
gloated emphasis of pluralism. In the case of postmodernists the problem 
starts especially with the basic naturalist assumption, that is the denial of 
extra-natural or extra-material dimensions of reality. This too is a version 
of the suppression of the plurality of creation that paves the way for evil 
to emerge. 
Postmodernist naturalists are of course not without their own ideas about 
the conditions for evil. They charge especially the spiritual ideals of 
modernism and Christianity of being merely a tool in maintaining 
oppression. According to Taylor (1989:70-71, 100, 519-520) the most 
prominent exponent of this form of naturalism was Nietzsche whose 
views are repeated in the postmodernism or neo-Nietzscheanism of 
Michel Foucault who saw some of the loftiest human goods as the cause 
“of untold misery and even savagery”. Allegiance to higher goods 
supposedly leads to a “suppression of ‘nature’, and this introduces 
relations of domination within us” which is then “fatally reflected” in the 
relations between people. This is taken by neo-Nietzscheans as a 
refutation of these goods. But, for Taylor it is a “cardinal mistake” to 
believe that “a good must be invalid if it leads to suffering or destruction”. 
Their argument fails to see that most moral positions are motivated by 
visions of the good. Naturalism wants us to lose the dimension that 
carries this appeal. Taylor, however, wants to be liberated from this 
naturalist stifling and mutilation of being human. 
And indeed, naturalists in the end cannot maintain their reductionist view 
of reality if they attempt to resist the evil of oppression. A good example 
is Foucault’s denial of the idea of a “sexual nature” for the human person. 
Foucault (1979:3-10, 106-107, 152, 154-155) attacks what he calls the 
“repressive hypothesis” in the popular discourse on sexual liberation. 
This hypothesis opposes an assumed repressive era or regime that tried 
to block the sexual nature from human life. But, Foucault argues, this 
“hypothesis” consists of a mere discourse (discursive practice/power) 
that produces the “idea of sex in itself”, which is actually a grouping 
together, into an artificial essence, of “anatomical elements, biological 
functions, conducts, sensations, and pleasures”. 
Foucault (1979:150-152) anticipates that his rejection of this fictitious 
essence will cause some to accuse him that he only sees “phenomena 
that are variable ... secondary and ultimately superficial”. Foucault 
(1979:157) meets this critique by affirming that we have “to counter the 
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grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges, in 
their multiplicity and their possibility of resistance”. He thus transposes 
the agent of resistance against the evil of oppression from the fictitious 
essence to “surface”, or material phenomena like the body and ex-
pressions of desire, and rejects in this attempt what he sees as the 
metaphysical illusion of a sexual essence. 
But, the counter-power of bodies raises the question whether Foucault 
really did get rid of all so-called metaphysical residues in the human 
being. Is the resistance of the body not the non-matter, agent-like 
behaviour that we usually associate with metaphysical essences like 
“sex-in-itself”? In other words, Foucault seems to have transposed re-
sistance against evil from some fictitious essence in the deep inside of 
the human subject onto the body as its locality.6 This move does not, 
strictly speaking, represent a return of essentialism in Foucault. 
However, some critics7 remark that Foucault needs something like an 
“essence” to promulgate effective arguments for non-oppressed life. 
These critics in other words highlight the absence of other dimensions to 
human life than the mere material as the weak point in Foucault’s 
argument for liberation. 
Another important postmodernist is more explicit about this need for a 
return of the non-material in our attempt to resist evil. According to Agnes 
Heller,8 people like Hitler or Stalin did not choose themselves “as evil or 
wicked” because we live in a world where they “cannot tell good from 
evil”. You can only make a personal choice to be evil “in a world where 
God is not yet dead” and where you are thus able to “choose yourself as 
an anti-Christ or as a demon or devil against the living God”. But despite 
her affirmation of the death of God, Heller still believes that good can be 
measured by the maxim that “it is better to suffer rather than commit 
injustice”. This means that she believes that “a lot of goodness is 
transcendent” and that even in our “modern ethic there is an absolute”. 
But she is very quick to add that she “cannot really answer the question 
                                           
6 Can we raise the same critique about this agentification of the body that Rorty 
(1993:33) has about Nietzsche’s, namely that it appears to be a kind of “inverted 
Platonism”; that it reminds of “the romantic attempt to exalt the flesh over the spirit”? 
And indeed, Rorty (1993:64) thinks that despite Nietzsche’s view “that the self, the 
human subject, is simply whatever acculturation makes of it, he still thinks in terms of 
something deep within human beings, which is deformed by acculturation”. 
7 Cf. e.g. the critique of Horowitz (1987:67-71), Dews (1989:38) and Lemert and Gillan 
(1982:105-106). 
8 Cf. her interview with John Rundell (2000:136-140). 
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why is the good person good” because this person is not “determined” to 
become good; his “determination is chosen by the good person himself”. 
The reason we find it difficult to distinguish between good and evil, she 
says, is because of the perspectivism of our time: “there is no totality of 
all perspectives, as there is no mind that can encompass this” and 
therefore “we see only segments”. She nevertheless denies that this 
should result in “a relativism or untruth” although it means “that there is 
an understanding that is also a misunderstanding” because the “centre is 
never hit because of this perspectivism”. 
Although her acknowledgement of the need for a return of the extra-
natural or the extra-material is very ambiguous and brittle in Heller, it is 
there and very important if we want to be good. In the current post-
modernism there is thus probably a stronger sense that human life 
functions on and is influenced by more levels than would be acknow-
ledged by these exponents of this kind of naturalism. 
3. Equality 
But the affirmation of structural plurality in human life as a condition for 
anti-cruelty should be enhanced with two other conditions. It should 
secondly have to be a plurality of capabilities and dimensions of equal 
value. Thirdly, this plurality of equally valued aspects of life should form a 
pattern of inter-connection in order to avert a fragmented pluralism, 
dualism or totalitarian monism. The rest of the article will be used to 
argue these two conditions. 
3.1 Anti-cruelty and our humanity 
From a Christian perspective one will have to move further than the mere 
recognition of the plurality in creation/life and the need to let this plurality 
flourish. Furthermore, we cannot rely only on the human abilities to 
reason and interpret to be the shield against evil. It is therefore significant 
to take note of prominent Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor’s 
(1991d:245) identification of God as one of the main authors of morality. 
However, notwithstanding his reticent pronouncements about the 
presence of God,9 Taylor attracts severe attacks from the secular corner. 
One such attack comes from Quentin Skinner (1991:147-150;1995:47) 
who argues that the impact of Christianity on humanity “was nothing less 
                                           
9 Commentators like Lovin (1991:264) and Waldron (1990:325) remark that Taylor’s 
argument represents a good example of the progress in contemporary Christian 
tolerance for non-christian views. 
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than catastrophic”.10 The recommendation to once again adopt 
Christianity thus seems to him like an instance of “offering a cure for our 
ills much worse than the disease”. Skinner takes note of a suggestion by 
Taylor that atrocities in the name of Christianity are no reason to dismiss 
this religion in total. But, he says, Taylor’s argument would be true only if 
he can assure us that the horrors committed in its name were “wholly 
unconnected with its character as a creed”. 
Part of the structural flaw that some naturalists see in Christianity 
pertains to the notorious dilemma in the theodicy problem. Rosen 
(1991:190-191) for instance confronts Taylor with the theodicy problem 
and argues that the notion of a cosmic order of divine origin contains a 
major inconsistency, namely that evil is incompatible with the concept of 
the world as the creation of “a single, benevolent deity”. The main 
answer of Christianity is that evil is caused by human action; it is 
retribution for “Original Sin”. This answer is given in order to avoid the 
heresy of Gnosticism that makes evil “a transcendent principle in its own 
right, in conflict with divine goodness”. The critical question of Rosen 
about God’s wrath against sin, namely, “is such unremitting and vicarious 
punishment really benevolent?”, is also relevant to the question whether 
a cruel god who is the author of a cruel world will be able to instil a spirit 
of anti-cruelty in his followers. 
Rosen’s premise, namely that God’s punishment is irreconcilable with 
anti-cruelty, ignores the point of especially the New Testament message 
of grace and the ethos of compassion this is supposed to evoke in the 
community of Christians. We can also point to the fact that one of the 
most important Christian ideals working in contemporary civilisation is a 
strong notion of human dignity11 that strengthens our ethos of anti-
cruelty. Taylor (1989:516-518; 1991b:241) also refers to it. He doubts 
whether naturalist secularism can give people dignity when humans are 
primarily seen as “rational, emancipated moderns”. This view, Taylor 
says, will break down in the case of “the irremediably broken” like 
mentally handicapped people, terminally ill people and unborn children 
with genetic defects. Enlightenment naturalists will argue that “perhaps 
                                           
10 This is a well-known complaint about Christianity. Cf. e.g. also Waldron (1990:326) 
and Bauman (1994:4-8). 
11 Even an atheist and postmodern relativist like Richard Rorty (1991:192, 197, 199-202) 
acknowledges that human dignity is given in Western communities by the strong 
motive of the Judaeo-Christian religion that the stranger without dignity is to be taken 
in and given dignity again. Balslev (1991:48-49) remarks that Rorty’s reference to the 
Judeao-Christian assumption “show[s] the inadequacy of the postmodernist bourgeois 
liberalism to support such a course of action without a meta-narrative”. 
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effort shouldn’t be wasted on these unpromising cases”. But, says 
Taylor, this is not the case for someone like Mother Teresa who argues 
from “a Christian spirituality”. This is for Taylor an indication that “great 
as the power of naturalist sources might be, the potential of a certain 
theistic perspective is incomparably greater”. For Taylor naturalist 
accounts are “inherently contestable in a way that the theistic outlook is 
not”. He agrees that theism is “contested as to its truth”, but “no one 
doubts that those who embrace it will find a fully adequate moral source 
in it”.12 For naturalist philosophers on the other hand, the problem is that 
even if everybody “fully recognize[s] the dignity of disengaged reason, or 
the goodness of nature”, this is in fact not “enough to justify the 
importance we put on it, the moral store we set by it”.  
But this claim that Christianity is a more adequate source of goodness, is 
not acceptable to naturalists. Kymlicka (1991:181) is for example “not at 
all clear in what other (non-prudential) sense God provides an adequate 
moral source”. Theists for instance put an embargo on scientific testing 
on human embryos because these embryos “bear the image of God”. But 
Kymlica asks: “So what?” The image of God has “no obvious moral 
relevance”. Qualities that have relevance are, for instance, the capacity 
to feel pain. Theists do not really explain why non-sentient human 
embryos deserve greater moral consideration than sentient animals. He 
foresees that theists will respond that he does not understand the full 
moral significance of being the image of God. But, says Kymlicka, he can 
say the same about a theist who fails to understand the full moral 
significance of rationality or sentience. His point is that there is “no sense 
in which the theist position is less ‘inherently contestable’”.13 
Kymlicka seems to suggest that it is acceptable to place human identity 
in a particular human capacity. This means that if our humanity and for 
that matter our human dignity, rests on sentience, reason, or any other 
human aspect or function, not all people will fully qualify for being human. 
Embryos, but also retarded human beings, will represent a subhuman 
species towards which we can act accordingly. However, to quote 
Taylor’s, this is not the motivation of Mother Teresa. She will treat the 
non-sentient as fully human. Although Taylor does not spell this out, 
Mother Teresa’s motivation has an important implication for our human 
                                           
12 According to Lemmens (1994:125, 131) and Shklar (1991:105), this point of view 
portrays his appreciation of the concept of divine grace as the absolute source of the 
good. I believe, however, that divine affirmation of the goodness of creation is a better 
way to describe that which motivates Taylor. 
13 Others raise the same point. Cf. Schneewind (1991:426) and Larmore (1991:161). 
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identity; this identity does not reside in any one of our aspects, functions, 
faculties, or dimensions. If it would have, it would have meant that if we 
lose it, we lose our full human identity. Thus, no aspect or dimension of 
being human is more human than the other – all of them are equal in the 
sense that not one of them can make us more human than another 
person. And this means that all human beings, despite differences of 
individual propensities, strengths and weaknesses, have equal dignity 
and deserve equal treatment and thus to be equally free from cruelty. 
3.2 The affirmation of creation 
Why should a Christian not treat a person who lacks certain abilities as 
subhuman? Kymlicka seems to miss the theistic point that if God calls 
you human, it means that even if you do not portray perfect human traits, 
you are still human.14 This seems15 to be Taylor’s (1989:521) point with 
his hope to find the “promise of divine affirmation of the human” in 
“Judaeo-Christian theism”. This, he says, assumes an affirmation of the 
human that is “more total than humans can ever attain unaided”. 
Taylor (1989:218, 516) regards naturalism as “in part motivated by the 
sense that in rejecting religion it is for the first time doing justice to the 
innocence of natural desire”. But this view implies for Taylor a parasitic 
attitude because “the original model” for the affirmation of nature is the 
connection between agape and the goodness of creation. In this respect 
we are dealing with the primordial divine affirmation of creation, which is 
given in the repeated phrase in Genesis 1 “and God saw that it was 
good”. To love human beings or any other being is, according to Taylor, 
“inseparable from such a ‘seeing-good’”. Taylor (1989:270) therefore 
argues that “sanctification” in the Judaeo-Christian tradition “does indeed 
involve embracing a higher morality”. This higher morality is, however, 
“not defined only in terms of certain ‘higher’ activities, or love of the order 
of things” but by “an affirming of life”. God affirms life and this is 
expressed in Christian thinking by the “key notion” of “agape, or charity, 
                                           
14 On this point it is instructive to take note of the debate between two groups of 
Christians to which Evans (1993:100-102) refers. One group claims that the human 
being is a given entity. A second sees personhood as an accomplishment reached 
through activities; to be a person is to become. The second viewpoint, he says, is 
unfriendly to the Christian view because it disables an ethic that honours the humanity 
of disabled, insane, unborn and other frail people. 
15 Klink (2002:78) finds Taylor’s reference to “divine affirmation” unclear. It is thus clear 
that the idea that it refers to a “bestowment of a human identity” depends heavily on 
my own interpretation. 
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God’s affirming love for the world (John 3:16), which humans through 
receiving can then give in turn”. 
According to Taylor (1989:13-14), the affirmation of creation and the 
ethos among Christians this evokes in the form of the affirmation of 
ordinary life “has become one of the most powerful ideas in modern 
civilization”.16 In fact, it influences our whole concept of what “it is truly to 
respect human life and integrity”. This influence is created especially 
through one of the offsprings of the affirmation of ordinary life, that is the 
“practical benevolence” or the importance we put on avoiding suffering.17 
According to Taylor (1989:12-13, 84-85, 258) the notion of benevolence 
has become a central aspect of secular Enlightenment morality;18 we are 
much more sensitive to suffering than our forebears. Important for my 
argument in this respect is that Taylor thinks that a major part of the 
explanation for this sensitivity to cruelty is that the idea of a hierarchical 
cosmic moral order, which gives sense to the idea that people should be 
punished if they do not know their proper place, has faded. This fading of 
hierarchy happened because of the influence of the affirmation of 
ordinary life. 
According to Taylor (1981:112-114; 1989:13-14 ,23, 81, 83, 211-213, 
215, 218, 235) the pre-modern era made a strict hierarchical distinction 
(i.e. dualism) between ordinary life (i.e. especially the life of production 
and reproduction, of work and the family) and the elitist, aristocratic 
values of contemplation and citizenship. Ordinary life is a life absorbed in 
meeting life-needs and the destiny of the majority of people. This 
                                           
16 Some critics doubt whether Taylor’s account of the pervasive influence of ordinary life 
is correct. Skinner (1991:140-142; 1995:41-42) for instance, argues that labour and 
family life do not have the value they used to have. Taylor (1991b:237-239) answers 
that the affirmation of ordinary life indeed transmutes, but that it maintains “a certain 
continuity” with its starting point in sixteenth-century Protestantism. The current belief 
that self-fulfilment culminates in sex is, for instance, such a continuance. This, he 
says, “would horrify the Puritan divines of yesteryear”. Nevertheless, the “continuity is 
there, and … illuminates”. 
17 That the avoidance of pain is probably the strongest moral motive currently at work in 
Western civilisation is also affirmed by Rorty (1993:xiv-xvi, 73-75, 146). 
18 Williams (1990:47) objects to the notion that this motive has been activated by 
Christianity. In fact, he thinks the modern liberal sense of benevolence has been 
resisted by Christianity. For instance, Christianity, though it was an “official” religion 
since the fourth century, did not do much to prohibit slavery. Taylor’s claim, Williams 
says, seems “either not obvious at all, or else so weak that it does not offer much to 
the self-understanding of modern liberalism”. Taylor would (as with similar arguments 
against his vision) probably retort that Williams fails to see the continuance between 
Christian benevolence and latter-day secular mutations. 
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dualistic and hierarchical concept was justified by the ancient concept of 
a hierarchical cosmic logos. According to Taylor it was the thinkers of the 
Reformation who made a difference when they hallowed ordinary life. 
The important issue for the Reformation, says Taylor, was how human 
life is led; “whether worshipfully and in the fear of God or not”. This 
motive has engendered a rejection of the claims made on behalf of the 
earlier elitist moral motives that excluded the “ordinary” goals and 
activities” of human life. This view also implied that the idea of a 
hierarchical chain of being was rejected. Taylor thinks this was a good 
development but he also points out that the affirmation of ordinary life 
gradually secularised and that its naturalist version wanted to “denounce 
all qualitative distinctions” for being “blind to the dignity and worth of 
ordinary human desire and fulfilment”. The idea of a life “according to 
nature” meant that the satisfaction of biological needs became a moral 
obligation in itself. This prepared the way to see the need “to be rightly 
placed in relation to the good” as a source of “suffering” or “self-delusion” 
or “smug self-satisfaction”. This naturalist version of an original Christian 
motive had the ironic effect that especially Christian “higher” moral ideals 
have been attacked since the Enlightenment “for laying a crushing 
burden on those in whom it inculcates a sense of sin”. 
The affirmation of ordinary life as Taylor describes it, is indeed an 
important correction to the dualistic and hierarchical elitist morality of pre-
modernism because it emphasises parts of life that had previously been 
ignored. Hart (1984:312-313) points out that the “deepest origin of 
dualism” is to be found in “a fundamental misinterpretation” of the 
“fundamental opposition between good and evil” which is a dualism of 
direction; you either move in the direction of the good or not. When we 
project evil on some aspect of life, we distortively reify evil by making this 
part the origin and carrier of evil. But this approach is to deny the 
fundamental goodness and thus equality of all aspects of life. 
However, the fact that secularism uses this emphasis on equality against 
Christianity should signal to us that everything is not well with what 
Taylor describes as the affirmation of ordinary life. This principle should 
give an alternative to the impression that Christianity can only envision a 
hierarchical life dominated by some metaphysical or idealistic world. 
Idealism gives, as in the case of Platonism and neo-Platonism, reason to 
denigrate the non-idealistic or non-metaphysical as lower in rank and to 
oppress it. But it is not only Christianity that struggles with the cruelty of 
totalitarian and hierarchical visions. An important point that Taylor should 
have made is that the secular emphasis on nature and desire is actually 
a rejection of the levelling effect of the affirmation of ordinary life. It 
implies that nature and desire become more ordinary than any other 
mode of living. This is not too far from introducing a new elitist motive 
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and thus a new hierarchy, a new dualism, and probably new forms of 
suffering. 
This ontological fallacy is already visible in Taylor’s description of the 
affirmation of ordinary life. Although he wants to be more comprehensive 
in what he acknowledges, he too steps into the trap of over-emphasising 
only certain aspects of creation. Taylor gives a very particular content to 
ordinary life: the life of production and reproduction. This, to once again 
use a common platitude, signals aspects of life that are more equal than 
others, that is, strictly speaking, against the spirit of the affirmation of 
ordinary life. This view, it seems to me, excludes a whole array of things 
that are also part of life. For instance, what about the life of leisure, 
aesthetics, maintenance, politics, religion, and so on? It should be 
acknowledged that the affirmation of the concept of ordinary life opened 
the way for the acknowledgement of the equality of the various human 
aspects which is an important condition for the existence of a full human 
life or a non-oppressed variety of human aspects. But it is important to be 
careful about what is included in the definition of ordinary life. It should 
not be a new reduction of the plurality of human aspects and dimensions 
of life; in fact all aspects of life should qualify for inclusion in “ordinary” 
life. 
4. A coherent human life 
I have argued thus far for a plurality of equally valued aspects and 
dimensions of reality and particularly of human life to enhance an ethos 
of anti-wickedness. But we also need to focus on the inter-relatedness 
and inter-connections between these aspects and dimensions in order to 
clear the way for a world of less evil. 
The affirmation of ordinary life opens room in Christianity (more precisely 
reformational Christianity19) for a process of secularisation that gives a 
greater appreciation for this life which softens the disengagement 
inherent to a severe secular-transcendent dualism. Taylor (1989:5-7, 16-
17, 26; 1991a:3) also acknowledges the inevitability of secularisation. He 
describes it as a demise of the ancient idea of the “cosmic order”. The 
cosmic order, he says, had been seen in ancient times as a hierarchy in 
which everything was tied to a “proper place” even if it meant a situation 
                                           
19 Cf. the following conclusion of Marshall after his struggle with the image of an 
evangelical Christianity that sees most aspects of ordinary life on earth to be part of 
the kingdom of sin or at least not part of God’s kingdom. He (Marshall, 1998:11) 
emphasises that “[o]ur destiny is an earthly one: a new earth, an earth redeemed and 
transfigured”. It is therefore “an unbiblical idea that the earth doesn’t matter because 
we are going to go to heaven when we die”. 
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of oppression. Although he does not want to go back to some pre-
modern phase, Taylor (1991a:2-4; 1989:507) is nevertheless “ambi-
valent” about the disenchanted condition. Cosmic orders not only re-
tricted people, they also “gave meaning to the world and the activities of 
social life”. The loss of this purpose resulted in a flattening of life because 
people focused on their individual lives; this attitude caused “a centring 
on the self” which made our lives “poorer in meaning, and less 
concerned with others”.20 
Thus, Taylor, contradistinctively to postmodern naturalists like Foucault, 
senses that we need to save a multidimensional perspective in order to 
escape the flattening of life caused by a relentless homogenisation or 
one-dimensionalisation of reality. But homogenization is the misguided 
expression of the sense that the dimensions of reality need to interact. 
We therefore need to add a third condition to our efforts to envision a 
reality that makes evil difficult to appear, that is that the structural variety 
should form a connected/engaged plurality and not a disengaged or 
fragmented pluralism. 
Pluralism assumes that engagement is a scarce commodity in our world 
where the various dimensions, aspects, and basic principles constantly 
overstep their boundaries and thus set the scene for the large amount of 
conflict and suffering that we experience. Berlin (1969:167-168) for 
instance observes that the belief that values like liberty, justice, 
generosity, loyalty and equality are perfectly compatible with one another 
is a fictitious metaphysical notion. He believes we can offer nothing more 
than the empirical observation that these values in many instances 
contradict one another because they make ultimate and absolute claims 
on human life. Does this mean that we have to accept that important 
ingredients of human life like liberty and equality should be omitted 
because they often contradict each other? But this will spell an 
acceptance of a condition conducive to evil. The fact that Berlin tries to 
affirm the importance of all goods while limiting the choice among them 
because of their empirical state of agonism, implies that he cannot 
escape the underlying wish (“idea”) that they would be reconcilable. This 
becomes even more probable when one takes into account that what 
Berlin (1969:170-171) actually criticises, is not reconciliation as such, but 
the reduction of all values to a single exalted one (i.e. monism) and the 
deformation of human life as the result of this monism. The point of 
mentioning pluralist reactions is that the need for connectedness 
between aspects often manifests in a reduction of all aspects/dimensions 
                                           
20 Taylor is supported in this evaluation by Descombes (1994:105). 
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of life to only one of them (i.e. monism). To portray this equalisation or 
homogenisation as unity is, however, not an expression of engagement 
but a denial or suppression of, and thus disengagement from some 
aspects. It is therefore important to dwell briefly on this homogenisation 
that makes an integrated view of reality and life impossible. 
In the place of monism we need an ontology that confesses for instance 
a coherent but nevertheless tripartite distinction between God, and the 
dimensions of firstly the motives/norms controlling our lives, and 
secondly, the human subjects in the grips of this order. In fact, I think it is 
crucial to make these distinctions while not losing the perspective on 
their coherence. A monism that emphasises only the coherence will 
inevitably evokes its antithesis in the form of dualism and pluralism. One 
such monism relevant to my argument is pantheism. Pantheism is a 
reduction of reality to only God and a suppression of, and disengage-
ment from the other two dimensions. Troost (1994:3-6,8-11) points out 
that the idea of a divine order was very much part of all ancient world 
religions. Important about this phenomenon was its inherent pantheism; 
the creature was seen as participating in the divine nature. With the 
origin of science and philosophy, however, a pagan anti-pantheism set 
in. In place of a divine world order, a belief in the “logos” arose. This 
logos-idea entered Christianity because Christianity too was sceptical 
about the idea of pantheism. But this was a fatal step (for Christianity) 
because the secularist view of nature was also accepted. This view was 
of a “desacralised” creational order and was therefore seen as something 
“self-existent”. A disengagement between God and reality/daily existence 
was created that lead to the pre-naturalist phenomenon of deism (or 
natural religion). 
A modern manifestation of this dualism (disengagement) is found in the 
marginalisation of religion to a so-called private sphere. In his critique of 
Taylor, Vogel (1993:332) for instance argues that the reason for the 
disenchantment of the universe is that religion “ultimately rest[s] on 
intuition or faith and so cannot be validated as knowledge within the 
realm of public argumentation”. Therefore, any view of the good that 
depends on religion is regarded as dogmatic to the contemporary mind 
and the imposition of religious ideas in the public domain is regarded as 
“the equivalent of religious warfare”. Taylor (1989:342) however, does 
not want to be a deist and chooses for moral sources that “involve God” 
because these sources present to him the “most illusion-free” sources. 
Taylor therefore seemingly wants to evade the trajectory that leads from 
a stance of anti-pantheism to dualistic deism to full-blown monistic 
naturalism. 
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Deism, because of the fear for religious warfare, is an example of a 
disengaging reaction to pantheism. But it is not only deism that is the 
victim of the disengagement evoked by the monistic paradigm of 
pantheism. As explained earlier, Foucault for instance, reacted so 
severely against the dualism which essentialism causes, that he 
entangles himself in the incoherences of seeing everything as simply 
“superficial natural phenomena” (i.e. naturalism). Moreover, pluralism, as 
the manifestation of the disconnectedness between the plurality, is also 
the captive of the aspirations of monism; pluralism is the 
overemphasised wish of the plurality to be affirmed. 
Pluralism, monism and dualism should thus be replaced by a paradigm 
of engagement. This, I believe, is only possible within the perspective of 
the cohering influence of the radically different Transcendent via His 
cosmological order. This perspective translates into a call for a creative 
and reformative zeal among Christians to preserve and deploy the 
structural variety of creation, to affirm the basic value equality of all parts 
of creation, but also constantly to seek avenues to keep this variety 
connected. This, in fact, should spell the basic structure of any strategy 
to avoid evil and its offspring, cruelty. 
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Kernbegrippe: 
boosheid 
menslike dimensies: pluraliteit, gelykheid en samehang  
wreedheid 
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